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Interference Alignment for Secrecy
Onur Ozan Koyluoglu, Hesham El Gamal, Lifeng Lai, and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract
This paper studies the frequency/time selective K-user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints.
Two distinct models, namely the interference channel with confidential messages and the one with an external
eavesdropper, are analyzed. The key difference between the two models is the lack of channel state information
(CSI) about the external eavesdropper. Using interference alignment along with secrecy pre-coding, it is shown that
each user can achieve non-zero secure Degrees of Freedom (DoF) for both cases. More precisely, the proposed
coding scheme achieves K−2
2K−2
secure DoF with probability one per user in the confidential messages model. For
the external eavesdropper scenario, on the other hand, it is shown that each user can achieve K−2
2K
secure DoF in
the ergodic setting. Remarkably, these results establish the positive impact of interference on the secrecy capacity
region of wireless networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was introduced by Wyner [1], in which the eavesdropper is assumed to have
access to a degraded version of the intended receiver’s signal. This pioneering work was later generalized
to cover the non-degraded scenario [2] and the Gaussian channel [3]. However, these results show that
the secrecy capacity saturates in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime implying a vanishing value
for the secure degrees of freedom (DoF).
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the analysis and design of secure wireless communication
networks based on information theoretic principles. For example, the secrecy capacity of relay networks
was studied in [4], [5], while the fundamental limits of the wiretap channel with feedback were analyzed
by [6]. On the other hand, the multiple access and broadcast channels with secrecy constraints were
investigated in [7], [8], [9]. Finally, the role of multiple antennas in enhancing the secrecy capacity was
established in [10], [11] and the positive impact of fading on secrecy capacity was revealed in [12], [13].
Here, the frequency/time selective K-user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints is
considered. Without the secrecy constraints, it has been recently shown that a 1
2
degrees of freedom
(DoF) per orthogonal dimension is achievable for each source-destination pair in this network [14]. The
achievability of this result was based on the interference alignment technique (see also [15]), by which the
interfering signals are aligned to occupy a subspace orthogonal to the one spanned by the intended signal
at each receiver. However, the impact of secrecy constraints on the degrees of freedom in this model has
not been fully characterized. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, the only relevant prior works are the
study of the two-user discrete memoryless interference channels with confidential messages [16], [17],
[18] and the one with an external eavesdropper [19]. The frequency selective interference channel adopted
in the present paper is, however, fundamentally different from these memoryless models.
We consider two distinct network models, namely 1) the interference channel with confidential messages
and 2) the one with an external eavesdropper. In the first scenario, one needs to ensure the confidentiality
of each message from all non-intended receivers in the network. Since all users are assumed to belong
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2to the same network, one can assume the availability of channel state information (CSI) while designing
the secrecy coding scheme. Towards this goal, we employ an interference alignment scheme along with
secrecy pre-coding at each transmitter. Intuitively, the interference alignment scheme has two effects on
each receiver i: 1) it aligns the signals from transmitters k 6= i to a small dimensionality subspace, and
2) it assigns the signal from transmitter i to the orthogonal subspace. Hence, while the signal from its
own transmitter is received cleanly, the signals from other transmitters are mixed together. Our secrecy
pre-coding takes advantage of the phenomenon to ensure that the resulting multiple access channel (from
the K−1 interfering users) does not reveal any useful information about each non-intended message. This
way, we show that 1
4
secure DoF per orthogonal dimension is achievable for each user in the three-user
Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages. We then generalize our results to the K-user
Gaussian interference channel showing that each user can achieve K−2
2K−2
secure DoF. In the second scenario,
we study the external eavesdropper model where the fundamental challenge is the lack of channel state
information (CSI) about the links connected to it. Despite this fact, it is shown that 1/2−1/K DoF per user
is achievable in the ergodic setting. This result provides further evidence on the diminishing gain resulting
from knowing the instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper a-priori. Interestingly, by comparing our results
with those obtained for the point-to-point case [12], [13], one can see the positive impact of interference
on the secrecy capacity region of wireless network. The underlying idea is that the coordination between
several source-destination pairs allows for hiding the secret messages in the background interference.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model and notation are
introduced. Section III is devoted to the interference channel with confidential messages. The analysis for
the external eavesdropper scenario is detailed in Section IV. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in
Section V. The technical results needed to develop our proofs are collected in the appendices to enhance
the flow of the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. The Confidential Messages Scenario
We consider a frequency selective wireless network comprised of K transmitter-receiver pairs where
the ith receiver output at time t ∈ {1, · · · , n} and frequency slot f ∈ {1, · · · , F} is given by 1
Yi(f, t) =
K∑
k=1
hik(f)Xk(f, t) + Zi(f, t). (1)
Here, Xk(f, t) is the transmitted symbol of user k at frequency slot f during time t, and Zi(f, t) ∼
CN (0, 1) is the additive white Gaussian noise at receiver i. We assume that the channel coefficients are
randomly generated according to a continuous distribution and are fixed during the communication period.
We also assume that the channel coefficients are known at every node in the network. The network model
is provided in Fig. 1.
Using the extended channel notation of [14], the ith received vector during time slot t can be written
as
Y¯i(t) =
K∑
k=1
Hi,kX¯k(t) + Z¯i(t). (2)
Here, Hi,k is the F × F diagonal matrix of channel coefficients from transmitter k to receiver i whereas
Y¯i(t) = [Yi(1, t), · · · , Yi(F, t)]T , Z¯i(t) = [Zi(1, t), · · · , Zi(F, t)]T , and X¯k(t) = [Xk(1, t), · · · , Xk(F, t)]T
are F × 1 column vectors.
1In this paper, matrices are represented with bold capital letters (X) and vectors are denoted as bold capital letters with bars or tildes (for
example, X¯ and X˜). We define K , {1, · · · ,K} and denote XS , {Xk|k ∈ S} for S ⊂ K. A zero-mean circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian random variable with variance σ2 is denoted by CN (0, σ2).
3We assume that each source k ∈ K has a message Wk which must be transmitted in secrecy from
the remaining K − 1 receivers. Therefore, our (n, F,M1, · · · ,MK) secret codebook has the following
components:
1) The secret message set Wk = {1, · · · ,Mk}.
2) Encoding functions fk(.) which map the secret messages to the transmitted symbols, i.e., fk : wk →
(X¯k(1), · · · , X¯k(n)) for each wk ∈ Wk. At encoder k, each codeword is designed according to the
transmitter’s average long-term power constraint ρ, i.e.,
1
nF
F∑
f=1
n∑
t=1
(Xk(t, f))
2 ≤ ρ.
3) Decoding functions φk(.) at receivers k ∈ K which map the received symbols to estimates of the
messages: φk(Yk) = Wˆk where Yk = {Y¯k(1), · · · , Y¯k(n)}.
The reliability of the transmission of user k is measured by the probability of error
Pe,k =
1
K∏
i=1
Mi
∑
(w1,··· ,wK) ∈W1×···×WK
Pr {φk(Yk) 6= wk|(w1, · · · , wK) is sent} ,
whereas the secrecy level is measured by the normalized equivocation defined as follows [1], [3]: For
receiver i, the equivocation for each subset of messages WS , S ⊂ K − i, is
∆S,i ,
H (WS |Yi)
H (WS)
.
We say that the rate-equivocation tuple (R1, · · · , RK , d) is achievable for the Gaussian interference
channel with confidential messages, if, for any given ǫ > 0, there exists an (n, F,M1, · · · ,MK) secret
codebook such that,
1
nF
log2Mk = Rk, ∀k ∈ K,
max{Pe,1, · · · , Pe,K} ≤ ǫ, (3)
and
∆S,i ≥ d− ǫ, ∀i ∈ K, ∀S ⊂ K − i,
where a symmetric secrecy notion for each user in the network is used. We also say that the symmetric
degrees of freedom (per orthogonal frequency-time slot) of η is achievable with perfect secrecy, if the
rate-equivocation tuple (R1 = R, · · · , RK = R, d = 1) is achievable and
η = lim
ρ→∞
R
log(ρ)
.
B. The External Eavesdropper Scenario
In this model, we assume the existence of an external eavesdropper who observes the signals of the K
sources (see Fig. 2). We consider an ergodic setting where the channel gains are fixed during a block of
n1 symbol times and then randomly change to another value for the next block. Hence, transmission time
of n time slots is divided into B fading blocks with n = n1B. We denote the received signals at receiver
i ∈ {1, · · · , K, e} using the extended channel notation as follows
Y¯i(j + (b− 1)n1) =
K∑
k=1
Hi,k(b)X¯k(j + (b− 1)n1) + Z¯i(j + (b− 1)n1), (4)
4where b ∈ {1, · · · , B} denotes the fading block b, j ∈ {1, · · · , n1} denotes the j th time instant of
the corresponding fading block, Hi,k(b) is the F × F diagonal matrix of channel coefficients between
transmitter k and receiver i during fading block b, and X¯k(j+(b−1)n1) is the transmitted vector of user
k at j th symbol of the bth fading block. We further define H , {Hi,k(b) : i, k ∈ K, b ∈ {1, · · · , B}} and
He , {He,k(b) : k ∈ K, b ∈ {1, · · · , B}}. We assume that H is known at all the nodes in the network,
whereas He is known only at the eavesdropper (only the statistical knowledge about the eavesdropper CSI
is available to the network users). The channel coefficients are i.i.d. samples of a zero-mean unit variance
complex Gaussian distribution.
The components of the secrecy codebook remain as before with the exception that each transmitter
must secure its own message only from the external eavesdropper. Accordingly, we modify the secrecy
requirement by considering the normalized equivocation seen by the eavesdropper. We denote the obser-
vation at the eavesdropper as Ye = {Y¯e(1), · · · , Y¯e(n)}, in which Y¯e(t) is defined similarly as Y¯i(t) for
t = 1, · · · , n. Therefore, the normalized equivocation for a subset of messages S ⊂ K is given by
∆S ,
H (WS |Ye,H,He)
H (WS)
.
We say that the rate-equivocation tuple (R1, · · · , RK , d) is achievable for the Gaussian interference
channel with an external eavesdropper, if, for any given ǫ > 0, there exits an (n, F,M1, · · · ,MK) secret
codebook such that
1
nF
log2Mk = Rk, ∀k ∈ K,
max{Pe,1, · · · , Pe,K} ≤ ǫ, (5)
and
∆S ≥ d− ǫ, ∀S ⊂ K.
It then follows that the symmetric DoF with perfect secrecy is defined along the same lines as in the
previous section.
III. THE K-USER GAUSSIAN INTERFERENCE CHANNEL WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
To illustrate the main idea, we start with the intuitive argument for the three-user Gaussian interference
channel. Let F = 2m+1 for some m ∈ N. This is the (2m+1) symbol extension of the three-user channel
considered in [14]. We now employ interference alignment precoding using the matrices V¯k of [14], so
that the transmitted signals are of the form X¯k(t) = V¯kX˜k(t), where X˜k(t) represents the vector of
mk streams transmitted from user k (see Fig. 3). According to the interference alignment principle, the
beamforming matrices V¯k are constructed to satisfy the following two properties:
1) The non-intended signals seen by each receiver are aligned within some low dimensionality subspace.
More precisely, the column space of the matrices Hi,kV¯k for k ∈ K − i lie in a subspace of dimension
F −mi at receiver i.
2) The intended streams span the orthogonal subspace, i.e., the columns of Hi,iV¯i are independent and
are orthogonal to that of Hi,kV¯k for each user k ∈ K − i.
This way, the F dimensional received signal space at each receiver is used to create mi interference
free dimensions, spanned by the desired streams. Now, let us consider receiver 1 as the eavesdropper for
the messages of users 2 and 3. This particular eavesdropper now sees the m streams X˜2(t) and m streams
X˜3(t) mixed together in a multiple access channel with only m dimensions. This key observation allows
for the secrecy precoding X˜2(t) and X˜3(t) to completely secure m/2 streams in each transmitted vector.
It is easy to see that a similar argument follows for securing each vector against the second potential
eavesdropper. In the limit of a large F = 2m + 1, the m/2 secure streams results in 1/4 secure DoF.
This intuitive discussion is formalize for the general case of a K-user Gaussian interference channel in
the following.
5Theorem 1: For the K-user Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages, a secure DoF
of η = K−2
2K−2
per frequency-time slot is almost surely achievable for each user.
Proof: We shall show that almost all codebooks in an appropriately constructed ensemble satisfy
the achievability conditions for symmetric secure DoF of η = K−2
2K−2
with probability that approaches to
1, for all channel coefficients, as n,m, ρ→∞.
Fix an m ∈ N. Let m1 = (m+1)M , mk = mM ∀k 6= 1, M = (K−1)(K−2)−1, and F = (m+1)M+mM
frequency slots. We now generate, for each user k, 2nmk
“
F
mk
(Rk+R
x
k
)
”
codewords each of length nmk with
entries that are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) ∼ CN
(
0, ρ−ǫ
ck
)
. We choose ck to satisfy
the power constraint for each user: ck =
tr(V¯kV¯
H
k
)
F
. These codewords are then randomly partitioned into
Mk = 2
nFRk message bins, each consisting of Mxk = 2nFR
x
k codewords. Hence, an entry of the kth user
codebook will be represented by Xˆk(wk, wxk) where the bin index wk ∈ Wk is the secrecy message and
the index wxk ∈ {1, · · · ,Mxk } is the randomization message. It is easy to see that the secure transmission
rate per orthogonal time and frequency slot is Rk.
To send a message wk, the kth transmitter looks into the bin wk ∈ Wk and randomly selects a codeword
in this bin, denoted by the index wxk , according to uniform distribution. It thus obtains Xˆk(wk, wxk) of
length nmk. We further partition the elements of this vector as Xˆk(wk, wxk) = [X˜k(1), · · · , X˜k(n)], where
each element is an mk × 1 vector. Then, for each symbol time t ∈ {1, · · · , n}, the transmitter employs
the interference alignment scheme, and maps X˜k(t) to X¯k(t) via X¯k(t) = V¯kX˜k(t), where we choose
the interference alignment matrices V¯k as in [14].
We choose the secrecy and randomization rates as follows 2.
Rk =
1
F
min
i∈K
{
I(X˜i; Y¯i)
}
−
1
(K − 1)F
max
i∈K
{
I(X˜K−i; Y¯i)
}
and
Rxk =
1
F
min
i∈K,S⊆K−i
{
1
|S|
I(X˜S ; Y¯i|X˜K−S−i)
}
(6)
The above rates are inside the decodability region for each user, i.e., Rk + Rxk ≤ 1F I(X˜k; Y¯k),
∀k ∈ K, implying that each user can reliably decode its own streams as n → ∞. Hence, using the
union bound argument, we can show that for a given ǫ there exists n0(ǫ) such that for any n > n0(ǫ)
max{Pe,1, · · · , Pe,K} ≤ ǫ for almost all codebooks in the ensemble. Our second step is to show that ∆S,i
can be made arbitrarily close to 1 for any i ∈ K and S ⊂ K− i for almost all codebooks in the ensemble.
Towards this end, it is sufficient to focus on the equivocation at an arbitrary receiver i ∈ K. Furthermore,
it is sufficient to establish perfect secrecy for the full message set since Lemma 4 shows that perfect
secrecy of the full message set implies secrecy for all subsets (Here, the full message set at the receiver
i refers to WK−i.). Denoting the observation of the eavesdropper as Yi, we write
H(WK−i|Yi) = H(WK−i,Yi)−H(Yi)
= H(WK−i,W
x
K−i,Yi)−H(W
x
K−i|WK−i,Yi)−H(Yi)
= H(WK−i) +H(W
x
K−i|WK−i) +H(Yi|WK−i,W
x
K−i) (7)
−H(W xK−i|WK−i,Yk)−H(Yi)
= H(WK−i) +H(W
x
K−i)− I(WK−i,W
x
K−i;Yi)−H(W
x
K−i|WK−i,Yi),
where the last equality follows from the fact that H(W xK−i|WK−i) = H(W xK−i) as the randomization (i.e.,
codeword) indices are independent of the message (i.e., bin) indices. We now bound each term of (7).
First
I(WK−i,W
x
K−i;Yi) ≤ I(X˜K−i(1), · · · , X˜K−i(n);Yi) (8)
2Since the channel coefficients are fixed and known everywhere, we omit the conditioning on them here.
6due to the Markov chain relationship
{WK−i,W
x
K−i} → {X˜K−i(1), · · · , X˜K−i(n)} → Yi. (9)
Combining this with the fact that
I(X˜K−i(1), · · · , X˜K−i(n);Yi) ≤ n max
p(X˜K−i)
I(X˜K−i; Y¯i),
we obtain
I(WK−i,W
x
K−i;Yi) ≤ n max
p(X˜K−i)
I(X˜K−i; Y¯i). (10)
Second
H(W xK−i) = log
(∏
k 6=i
Mxk
)
= nF
∑
k∈K−i
Rxk . (11)
To upper bound the last term, we use the following argument. Assume that wK−i ∈ WK−i is transmitted.
Given these bin indices, the remaining randomness in W xK−i at the eavesdropper can be resolved for almost
all codebooks as the above choice of Rxk satisfies the multiple access channel achievability conditions∑
k∈S
Rxk ≤
1
F
I(X˜S ; Y¯i|X˜K−S−i), ∀S ⊂ K − i [20, Chapter 14]. Then, by Fano’s inequality, we have
H(W xK−i|WK−i = wK−i,Yi) ≤ nδ(n, wK−i), where δ(n, wK−i) → 0 as n → ∞. Then, defining δ(n) ,
max
wK−i∈WK−i
δ(n, wK−i), we have
H(W xK−i|WK−i,Yi) =
∑
wK−i∈WK−i
H(W xK−i|WK−i = wK−i,Yi) p(WK−i = wK−i)
≤ nδ(n), (12)
where δ(n) → 0 as n → ∞. Using equations (10), (11), and (12) in (7) and dividing both sides of by
H(WK−i), we obtain
∆K−i,i ≥ 1− δˆ, (13)
δˆ ,
δ(n) + max
p(X˜K−i)
I(X˜K−i; Y¯i)− F
∑
k∈K−i
Rxk
F
∑
k∈K−i
Rk
,
=
δ(n) + max
p(X˜K−i)
I(X˜K−i; Y¯i)− (K − 1) min
i∈K,S⊆K−i
{
1
|S|
I(X˜S ; Y¯i|X˜K−S−i)
}
(K − 1)min
i∈K
{
I(X˜i; Y¯i)
}
−max
i∈K
{
I(X˜K−i; Y¯i)
} , (14)
where we used the fact that H(WK−i) = nF
∑
k∈K−i
Rk and the rate assignment given by (6).
It is already observed that δ(n) → 0 as n → ∞ for almost all codebooks in the ensemble. The
orthogonality of the intended message and interference at each respective receiver along with the full rank
property of the gain matrices (see Lemma 5) imply the followings.
lim
ρ→∞
max
p(X˜K−i)
I(X˜K−i; Y¯i)
log(ρ)
= F −mi, ∀i ∈ K, (15)
lim
ρ→∞
I(X˜S ; Y¯i|X˜K−S−i)
log(ρ)
= r, (16)
7where r = mM or r = (m+ 1)M depending on i,
lim
ρ→∞
I(X˜i; Y¯i)
log(ρ)
= mi, ∀i ∈ K, (17)
and
lim
ρ→∞
I(X˜K−i; Y¯i)
log(ρ)
= F −mi, ∀i ∈ K. (18)
Using the observations (15), (16), (17), and (18) in (14) we see that
lim
n,m,ρ→∞
δˆ = 0 (19)
for almost all codebooks in the ensemble. Hence, for any given ǫ > 0, we can make ∆K−i,i ≥ 1 − ǫ by
letting n,m, ρ grow. Finally, due to (6), (17), and (18), we obtain
η = lim
m,ρ→∞
Rk
log(ρ)
=
K − 2
2K − 2
. (20)
which proves our result.
IV. THE K-USER GAUSSIAN INTERFERENCE CHANNEL WITH AN EXTERNAL EAVESDROPPER
First, it is easy to see that our previous results extend naturally when the eavesdropper CSI is available
a-priori at the different transmitters and receivers. Intuitively, one can imagine the existence of a virtual
transmitter associated with the external eavesdropper transforming our K-user network into another one
with K + 1-users. This way, one can achieve a secure DoF of η = (K+1)−2
2(K+1)−2
= K−1
2K
per frequency-time
slot for each user using the scheme of the previous section. For example, for a two-user network with an
external eavesdropper, it is possible to achieve 1
4
secure DoFs if the eavesdropper CSI is available at the
transmitters. More formally, we have the following result.
Corollary 2: For the K-user Gaussian interference channel with an external eavesdropper, a secure DoF
of η = K−1
2K
per frequency-time slot is almost surely achievable for each user (assuming the availability
of the eavesdropper CSI).
More interestingly, it is still possible to achieve positive secure DoF per user in the absence of the
eavesdropper CSI by exploiting the channel ergodicity. In the ergodic model, the channel gains are
assumed to be fixed during a block of n1 symbol times and then randomly change to another value in the
next block for a total of B blocks, where n1 →∞ and B →∞.
Again, for illustration purposes, we use the K = 3 case. Here, the users of the network have 3m+1
2m+1
total
DoF while the multiple access channel (MAC) seen by the eavesdropper can have only one DoF from
its observations. Hence, via an appropriate choice of secrecy codebooks, the m
2m+1
additional DoF can be
evenly distributed among the network users on the average, allowing for a 1
6
secure DoF per user without
any requirement on the eavesdropper CSI. In the general case, we have the following result.
Theorem 3: For the K-user Gaussian interference channel with an external eavesdropper, a secure DoF
of η = 1
2
− 1
K
per frequency-time slot is achievable for each user in the ergodic setting (in the absence of
the eavesdropper CSI).
Proof: Let m ∈ N and F = (m+1)M+mM , where M = (K−1)(K−2)−1. We set m1 = (m+1)M
and mk = mM for k 6= 1. We generate all the permutations of length K and denote this set by Π,
where |Π| = K!. Then, for each fading block b ∈ {1, · · · , B}, we randomly pick, according to uniform
distribution, a permutation from Π and denote it by πb. In order to ensure statistical symmetry, the
interference alignment matrices in each fading block will be obtained according to a different user ordering
induced by πb. More specifically, let k(b) = πb(k) and H(b)i(b),k(b) = Hi,k(b). Using the newly ordered
channel matrices H(b)
i(b),k(b), the interference alignment matrix for the user k(b), i.e., V¯k(b), is generated.
8For each secrecy codebook in the ensemble, we generate 2nF (Rk+Rxk) sequences each of length n1
B∑
b=1
mk(b),
where entries are chosen i.i.d. ∼ CN
(
0, P−ǫ
c
)
for some ǫ > 0 and c that satisfies the long term average
power constraint (the existence of ǫ and c follows from the argument of Theorem 1). We independently
assign each codeword to one of Mk = 2nFRk bins each having Mxk = 2nFR
x
k codewords. Given wk,
transmitter k chooses the corresponding bin and independently (according to uniform distribution) chooses
a codeword in that bin denoted by Xˆk(wk, wxk), where wxk is the randomization index. This codeword is
then divided into B blocks, each with a length n1mk(b) symbols. Each block is then arranged in the
following mk(b) × n1 matrix [X˜k(1 + (b− 1)n1), · · · , X˜k(n1 + (b− 1)n1)], where X˜k(j + (b− 1)n1), for
1 ≤ j ≤ n1, is an mk(b)×1 vector. At time slot t = j+(b−1)n1, the kth transmitter maps X˜k(t) to X¯k(t)
via X¯k(t) = V¯k(b)X˜k(t). Finally, we would like to emphasize the fact that in the sequel expectations
will be taken with respect to the random distribution of the channel matrices and the uniform distribution
underlying the permutation operators used in different fading blocks.
Our first key observation is that the equivalent channel matrices Hi,k(b)V¯k(b) connecting X˜k(t) and
Y¯i(t) are identically distributed ∀i, k ∈ K and b ∈ {1, · · · , B}. This property will allow us to drop the
subscript i and write E[I(X˜i; Y¯i|H)] = E[I(X˜; Y¯|H)], ∀i ∈ K in the following. To satisfy the achievability
conditions and the secrecy requirements of the network, we choose Rk and Rxk as follows
Rk =
1
KF
(
KE[I(X˜; Y¯|H)]− max
p(X¯K)
E[I(X¯K; Y¯e|H,He)]
)
and
Rxk =
1
KF
E[I(X˜K; Y¯e|H,He)], (21)
where the maximization in the first equation is among all possible input distributions. With this choice
of rates, we have the following
Rk +R
x
k =
1
F
E[I(X˜; Y¯|H)]−
1
KF
max
p(X¯K)
E[I(X¯K; Y¯e|H,He)] +
1
KF
E[I(X˜K; Y¯e|H,He)]
≤
1
F
E[I(X˜; Y¯|H)], (22)
where the inequality is due to the maximization among all possible input distributions in the second term
of the equation. Hence, we have Rk + Rxk ≤ 1FE[I(X˜; Y¯|H)], from which we conclude that each user
in the interference network can decode its own secrecy and randomization indices as n1 → ∞ and as
B →∞ (using almost all codebooks in the ensemble). The next step is to study the equivocation at the
eavesdropper, i.e.,
1
n
H(WK|Ye,H,He) =
1
n
(
H(WK,Ye,H,He)−H(Ye,H,He)
)
=
1
n
(
H(WK,W
x
K,Ye,H,He)−H(W
x
K|WK,Ye,H,He)
−H(Ye,H,He)
)
=
1
n
(
H(WK) +H(W
x
K|WK) +H(Ye,H,He|WK,W
x
K)
−H(W xK|WK,Ye,H,He)−H(Ye,H,He)
)
=
1
n
(
H(WK) +H(W
x
K)− I(WK,W
x
K;Ye,H,He)
−H(W xK|WK,Ye,H,He)
)
, (23)
where the last equality follows from the fact that H(W xK|WK) = H(W xK) as the codeword indices are
independent of the bin indices. Here,
H(W xK) = log
(
K∏
k=1
Mxk
)
=
K∑
k=1
nFRxk = nE[I(X˜K; Y¯e|H,He)] (24)
9and
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(WK,W
x
K;Ye,H,He) ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
I(X˜K(1), · · · , X˜K(n);Ye,H,He)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
(
I(X˜K(1), · · · , X˜K(n);H,He)
+I(X˜K(1), · · · , X˜K(n);Ye|H,He)
)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
I(X˜K(1), · · · , X˜K(n);Ye|H,He)
= E[I(X˜K; Y¯e|H,He)], (25)
where the first inequality is due to the Markov chain relationship
{WK,W
x
K} → {X˜K(1), · · · , X˜K(n)} → {Ye,H,He},
and the last one is due to ergodicity. For the last term of (23), we observe that the channel seen by
the eavesdropper reduces to a fading MAC channel for the randomization messages due to the code
construction. For this fading MAC, each user is able to set its randomization message rate as a fraction
1
K
of the total DoF seen by the eavesdropper as chosen in (21), and assure the decodability of the
randomization messages at the eavesdropper given the secrecy message indices (the technical details are
reported in Lemma 6, Lemma 7, and Lemma 8). Then, by Fano’s inequality, we have
lim
n1,B→∞
H(W xK|WK,Ye,H,He)
n1B
= 0,
for almost all codebooks in the ensemble. Therefore, by dividing both sides of (23) by 1
n
H(WK), we can
ensure
∆K =
H(WK|Ye,H,He)
H(WK)
≥ 1− ǫ, (26)
for any ǫ > 0 as n1, B → ∞, which is sufficient for our purposes (please refer to Lemma 4). Finally,
considering (21), we have
lim
ρ→∞
E[I(X˜; Y¯|H)]
log(ρ)
=
(
1
K
m1 +
K − 1
K
m2
)
,
and hence
lim
ρ→∞
Rk
log(ρ)
=
1
KF
(
K
(
1
K
m1 +
K − 1
K
m2
)
− F
)
=
(K − 2)mM
KF
(27)
implying that η = mM
F
− 2m
M
KF
DoF is achievable for each user for any m. Consequently, we conclude that
lim
m→∞
η = 1
2
− 1
K
symmetric DoF is achievable with perfect secrecy in the ergodic setting.
It is important to observe that the achievability of a positive DoF for the no eavesdropper CSI scenario
hinges largely on the ergodicity assumption, whereas when the eavesdropper CSI is assumed to be available
our results hold almost surely for all channel realizations. This is the price entailed by the lack of
eavesdropper CSI. Finally, the positive impact of interference on the secrecy capacity region is best
illustrated by comparing our results to the point-to-point scenario. In [13], a point-to-point channel with
an external eavesdropper was shown to have zero DoF. On the other hand, our results show that as
more source-destination pairs are added to the network, each pair is able to achieve non-zero DoF for
K ≥ 2. This seemingly surprising result is due to interference alignment technique which not only allows
for a clean separation between the intended message and interference at each receiver, but also packs the
interfering signals into a low dimensionality subspace, and hence, impairs the ability of each eavesdropper
to distinguish any of the secure messages efficiently.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have considered the K-user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints.
By using the interference alignment scheme along with secrecy pre-coding at each transmitter, we have
shown that each user in the network can achieve a non-zero secure DoF. Our results differentiate between
the confidential messages scenario and the case where an external eavesdropper, with unknown CSI, is
present in the network. The most interesting aspect of our results is, perhaps, the discovery of the role of
interference in increasing the secrecy capacity of multi-user wireless networks.
APPENDIX I
LEMMA 4
Lemma 4: Consider receiver i ∈ K. For a given ǫ > 0 and d ∈ [0, 1], ∃ǫ∗(i, ǫ, d) > 0 such that, if
∆K−i,i ≥ 1− ǫ∗(i, ǫ, d) then ∆S,i ≥ d− ǫ, ∀S ⊆ K − i.
Proof: For a given i ∈ K, ǫ > 0, and level of secrecy d ∈ [0, 1], let ǫ∗(i, ǫ, d) = min
S⊆K−i
(1 + ǫ −
d) H(WS )
H(WK−i)
. Then, denoting the received observation of the eavesdropper as Yi and assuming ∆K−i,i ≥
1− ǫ∗(i, ǫ, d), for any S ⊆ K − i we have
H(WS |Yi) +H(WK−i|WS ,Yi) = H(WK−i|Yi)
≥ H(WK−i)− ǫ
∗(i, ǫ, d)H(WK−i) (28)
≥ H(WS) +H(WK−i|WS)− (1 + ǫ− d)H(WS),
where the first inequality follows from the assumption of ∆K−i,i ≥ 1−ǫ∗(i, ǫ, d) and the second inequality
follows from the choice of ǫ∗(i, ǫ, d) above. Continuing from above,
∆S,i =
H(WS |Yi)
H(WS)
≥ (d− ǫ) +
H(WK−i|WS)−H(WK−i|WS ,Yi)
H(WS)
≥ (d− ǫ),
as conditioning does not increase entropy.
APPENDIX II
LEMMA 5
Lemma 5: The gain matrix, resulting from the interference alignment scheme, between transmitter k
and the receiver i, i.e., Hi,kV¯k, has rank mk with probability one. As the dimension of Hi,kV¯k is F ×mk,
these matrices have full rank with probability one.
Proof: We have rank(Hk,kV¯k) = mk by the construction given in [14]. Now, the second observation
follows by the design of interference alignment vectors, which have linearly independent columns (If they
had linearly dependent columns, then Hk,kV¯k would not have mk linearly independent columns, contrary
to the construction of the interference alignment matrices.). Here, rank(Hi,kV¯k) ≤ min{mk, F} = mk for
i 6= k. We need only to show that the matrix Hi,kV¯k has mk linearly independent columns. Considering
any i 6= k, representing diagonal elements of Hi,k as {hi,k(1), hi,k(2), · · · , hi,k(F )} and denoting the
rows of the interference alignment matrix by vf , i.e., V¯k = [vT1 ;vT2 ; · · · ;vTF ]T , we have Hi,kV¯k =
[hi,k(1)v
T
1 ; hi,k(2)v
T
2 ; · · · ; hi,k(F )v
T
F ]
T
. At this point, as the channel gains are chosen according to a
continuous distribution, the hik(f)’s are non-zero with probability one for f ∈ {1, 2, · · · , F}. Hence, these
row operations will not change the rank of a matrix, i.e., rank(Hi,kV¯k) = rank(V¯k) = mk. Therefore, the
gain matrices seen by the receivers have full rank with probability one.
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APPENDIX III
LEMMA 6
Lemma 6: For any M,L ⊂ K satisfying M∩L = ∅,
I(X˜M; Y¯e|H,He) ≤ I(X˜M; Y¯e|X˜L,H,He).
Proof:
I(X˜M; Y¯e|H,He) = H(X˜M|H,He)−H(X˜M|Y¯e,H,He)
≤ H(X˜M|X˜L,H,He)−H(X˜M|Y¯e, X˜L,H,He) (29)
= I(X˜M; Y¯e|X˜L,H,He),
where the inequality is due to the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy, and the last equality
follows by H(X˜M|X˜L,H,He) = H(X˜M|H,He) asM∩L = ∅ and messages of the users are independent.
APPENDIX IV
LEMMA 7
Lemma 7:
1
|Sc|
E[I(X˜Sc ; Y¯e|H,He)] ≤
1
|S|
E[I(X˜S ; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)] (30)
Proof: Let us denote |S| = S; and define S = {s1, · · · , sS} and Sc = {sS+1, · · · , sK}. Then we
have
1
|Sc|
E[I(X˜Sc ; Y¯e|H,He)]
=
1
K − S
(
E[I(X˜sS+1; Y¯e|H,He)] + E[I(X˜sS+2; Y¯e|X˜sS+1,H,He)] + · · ·
+ E[I(X˜sK ; Y¯e|X˜sS+1, · · · , X˜sK−1 ,H,He)]
)
≤
1
K − S
(
E[I(X˜s1 ; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)] + E[I(X˜s1; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)] + · · ·
+ E[I(X˜s1; Y¯e|X˜Sc ,H,He)]
)
=
1
K − S
(
(K − S)E[I(X˜s1; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)]
)
=
1
S
(
SE[I(X˜s1 ; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)]
)
=
1
S
(
E[I(X˜s1; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)] + E[I(X˜s2; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)] + · · ·
+ E[I(X˜sS ; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)]
)
≤
1
S
(
E[I(X˜s1 ; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)] + E[I(X˜s2; Y¯e|X˜Sc, X˜s1,H,He)] + · · ·
+ E[I(X˜sS ; Y¯e|X˜Sc, X˜s1, · · · , X˜sS−1,H,He)]
)
=
1
|S|
E[I(X˜S ; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)], (31)
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where we repeatedly use Lemma 6 for inequalities and use the fact that E[I(X˜k; Y¯e|X˜L,H,He)] =
E[I(X˜i; Y¯e|X˜L,H,He)] for any k 6= i and for any L ⊂ K− {k, i}. We note that the last property stated
above is due to the symmetry between network users provided by the random choice of user ordering at
each fading block.
APPENDIX V
LEMMA 8
Lemma 8: Each user can set the randomization rates to be 1
K
th of the total DoF per orthogonal time-
frequency slot seen by the eavesdropper, i.e., with a rate choice of
Rxk =
1
KF
E[I(X˜K; Y¯e|H,He)], (32)
each randomization message (codeword index), given the secrecy message (bin index) of each user, is
decodable at the eavesdropper.
Proof: Let S ⊂ K. From Lemma 7, we have
1
|Sc|
E[I(X˜Sc ; Y¯e|H,He)] ≤
1
|S|
E[I(X˜S ; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)].
We continue as below.
1
|Sc|
E[I(X˜Sc ; Y¯e|H,He)] ≤
1
|S|
E[I(X˜S ; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)] (33)
⇔ |S|E[I(X˜Sc ; Y¯e|H,He)] ≤ (K − |S|)E[I(X˜S ; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)] (34)
⇔
|S|
K
E[I(X˜Sc ; Y¯e|H,He)] ≤
K − |S|
K
E[I(X˜S ; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)] (35)
⇔
|S|
K
E[I(X˜K; Y¯e|H,He)] ≤ E[I(X˜S ; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)], (36)
from which we readily conclude that Rxk = 1KFE[I(X˜K; Y¯e|H,He)] satisfies∑
k∈S
Rxk =
|S|
KF
E[I(X˜K; Y¯e|H,He)] ≤
1
F
E[I(X˜S ; Y¯e|X˜Sc,H,He)], ∀S ⊂ K, (37)
and hence randomization messages are decodable at the eavesdropper with this rate assignment.
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Fig. 1. K-user interference channel with confidential messages.
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Fig. 2. K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper.
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Fig. 3. Proposed encoder and decoder architecture for user k in the K-user interference channel with confidential messages.
2nFR
x
k
2
1
1
Xˆk(wk, w
x
k
)
2nFRk
wk
w
x
k
Fig. 4. Proposed codebook structure for user k. The secret message of user k results in the bin index wk and the randomization index for
the corresponding user is wxk . Considering these two indices, each entry of the codebook is denoted as Xˆk(wk, wxk).
